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"A Lioness for Denmark"?-Ambassador Eugenie
Anderson and Danish American Relations,
1949-1953
by John Pederson

On the basis of your thorough knowledge
of Danish conditions you stood up in
public in the United States like a
lioness for Denmark's case.
Danish Foreign Minister Ole Bjorn Kraft1
If you seek the ideal ambassador, I
say to you, look at your guest of honor.
United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson2
Thus did the respective Foreign Service leaders of Denmark and the
United States assess Eugenie Anderson's tenure as America's
ambassador to Denmark. Danish Foreign Minister Ole Bjorn Kraft
made his remarks at the farewell dinner for Ambassador Anderson
at Christiansborg Castle in 1953. Going from Red Wing, Minnesota
to Copenhagen, she had served throughout most of the Korean War.
The trappings and glamour of an ambassador's power and rank are
seductive, particularly for political appointments. In extreme cases
some ambassadors become as much an advocate for the country
where they are stationed as the one they serve. 3 In Anderson's case,
however, she had the praise of not one, but both countries. Acheson
wrote his comments for a dinner Minnesota Senator Hubert
Humphrey held for Anderson upon her return. Besides serving
during a turbulent part of the Cold War, Anderson also deserves
attention as the first woman ambassador of the United States. To
evaluate the accuracy of the ringing endorsement of Anderson's
ambassadorship from both Danish and American officials, this paper
examines her arrival in Denmark, her first Fourth of July there, a
speech she prepared for broadcast in the United States, the Korean
War, and American assessments of Danish defense preparations.
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Overall, she improved the American image in Denmark and
enhanced relations between the two countries.
Anderson's Arrival in Copenhagen
A trip with her husband to Europe on the eve of World War II
sparked Anderson's political involvement. Returning home to
Minnesota, she joined a core of talented individuals who coalesced
around Hubert Humphrey, (including Eugene McCarthy, Orville
Freeman, and later Walter Mondale) in the Democratic Farmer Labor
Party, and actively participated in the 1948 Presidential campaign.
After Harry Truman's election, India Edwards, executive director of
the Women's Division of the Democratic Party, told Truman that she
wanted "a lot of jobs for a lot of women." Anderson's name was one
of the first that Edwards suggested. The initial speculation centered
on Anderson going to the Netherlands. One of her supporters,
Harvard Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., wrote to her that the then
current ambassador was "notable chiefly for his activities in
pinching Dutch ladies." Schlesinger added, "It would be interesting
as an example of reverse lend-lease to have an ambassador now who
would bring out the same impulses in Dutch men." 4 A woman
ambassador would certainly set precedents, requiring a careful
selection of the appropriate candidate as well as the country.
So why did she end up in Denmark? The Scandinavian countries
were known for their progressive welfare states, the strength of
Social Democracy, and an advanced attitude toward gender
equality. If this was the reason, than the Truman Administration's
view of Denmark may be considered flattering. Or, perhaps,
Denmark's small international role made it a relatively "safe" place
to have a woman ambassador.
In this case the Truman
Administration's view of Denmark would be less flattering-if a
mistake occurred here it mattered little.5 Nonetheless, when the
Danish government realized that the United States might send a
woman as its next ambassador, especially when Washington
socialite Perle Mesta was thought a leading candidate, it expressed
concern. Consequently, Secretary of State Acheson arranged for
Anderson to meet with the Danish Ambassador, Henrik Kauffman,
in New York prior to her appointment. Afterwards Ambassador
Kauffman reported about her back to Copenhagen, "No Perle, a
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pearl!" 6
The Danish press discussed Anderson's appointment with
interest. The independent Danish newspaper Information provided a
striking example, as it explicitly advised Anderson, publishing an
open letter to her in English. This caught the attention of American
officials as well as the Danish public. The Cold War alliance
between the United States and Denmark, according to the letter,
presented Anderson a great task. "It may not mean much to the
average American. But it is deadly serious to all Danes," declared
the letter. Information warned Anderson about focusing on social
circles of the diplomatic community, telling her the importance of
meeting "the Denmark that really matters, not the insignificant highsociety sets." 7 This advice she appeared to heed.
The first party Anderson held in
Copenhagen was for the Danish
workers who had restored the
official residence, Rydhave. She
invited some forty-five families of
carpenters, plumbers, electricians,
masons, painters, bricklayers, and
apprentices. 8 Rydhave's next big
event, a cocktail party reception for
Copenhagen's entire diplomatic
community, also impressed the
Danish public. Rydhave was too
small to host everyone on the
Eugenie Anderson's arrival in
invitation list, requiring the party to
Copenhagen in the "Royal
be held over two days. Rather than
Coach and Four," December
invite the most important people
22, 1949
one day, and the less important the
(Minnesota Historical Society)
second, she did it alphabetically,
surnames A-L the first day, M-Z on the second. 9
A Danish Fourth of July
Few countries outside the United States celebrate the Fourth of
July as much as Denmark. 10 In 1950 Danish Prime Minister Hans
Hedtoft spoke at the annual Danish-American Fourth of July festival
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in Rebild. He welcomed Ambassador Anderson and expressed
gratitude to the American people and government for their wartime
sacrifices and magnanimous postwar aid to Europe. 11 During this
occasion of Danish-American solidarity, however, Hedtoft described
not only the ties between the United States and Denmark, but also a
distinct Danish identity, one that differed "from both west and east."
We are a people who for more than a thousand years have
had our own culture, but we have always been anxious to
become familiar with culture and life of other countries.
America has always attracted sons and daughters of Denmark.
.. We miss those who have migrated to America, but we are
delighted that they contribute to strengthening bonds between
the two countries. Industriousness, endurance, feeling of
mutual belonging and respect for their fellow men are among
[the] qualifications that make them best representatives that
we might wish for Danish-mindedness. 12
"Danish-mindedness" also included peace. Hedtoft asserted that all
the NATO countries had defensive objectives only. Otherwise, he
argued that Denmark would not have joined. 13
Then Anderson rose to give her first public speech in Danish.
After her arrival the previous December, she had begun studying
Danish. On Mother's Day she had already given a brief radio
address in Danish, but that had been prerecorded. She worried that
the crowd of 30,000 would not understand her. Her theme was the
interdependence between the United States and Denmark, stating
"the preservation of our Independence depends upon the mutual
recognition and acceptance of our Inter-dependence - one on the
other." Alluding to the Danish tradition of cooperation, she said
that Denmark and the United States shared a community of values
with the other NATO members. The crowd responded favorably
when she endorsed the United Nations involvement in Korea. After
applause that she regarded as deafening and heartwarming, she
thought that she was "off to a good start." Indeed she was. 14
Essayist Peggy Lampson contends that, "If the Danes had opened
their hearts to her after her first embassy party, they gave their
hearts to her outright after the Fourth of July." 15 Many American
observers in Denmark agreed. Not only was Anderson's address
broadcast on radio across Denmark, most Danish newspapers
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prominently reported it. Some Danish papers printed its entirety,
others had extensive quotations.
An unidentified American
newspaperman expressed astonishment to embassy officials at the
attention and space the Danish press gave to reporting those
festivities. 16
The Korean War

Anderson was also off to a good start with prominent American
political figures. Eleanor Roosevelt visited Copenhagen as part of
the American Legation to the United Nations. She wrote to
Anderson, "I was delighted to hear so many fine things about you,
and as a woman, it makes me very proud." 17 Just a couple of weeks
latter Truman sent a brief typed note thanking Anderson for
supporting his policy actions in Korea. At the end of the note he
added in his own handwriting, "I hear nothing but good reports
about the Ambassador to Denmark. It makes me happy and
proud." 18
After the beginning of the Korean War, many Danes and other
Europeans worried the hostilities would spread to Europe.
Anderson was also concerned as she and her husband talked almost
nightly about whether or not to send their two children back to the
United States. To do so, however, may have implied that the
ambassador was anticipating war in Europe or at least considered it
possible. The children, who had learned Danish themselves and
were enjoying attending Danish schools, stayed. 19
During the September 1950 Danish national election campaign,
the governing Social Democrats downplayed the need to increase
defense spending. A rising standard of living was the priority;
therefore, they argued, defense burdens "must be divided according
to the capacity of citizens" without impairing national social and
cultural standards. 20 American officials observed that the need for
more defense spending was not a campaign issue and the Social
Democratic platform was "so formulated as to appeal to the pacifist
elements." 21
As 1950 ended, Danish attitudes disappointed the United States.
Besides opposing the pursuit of Communist forces north across
Korea's 38th parallel, Anderson reported that a "vigorous spirit of
self-defense" was lacking among the Danish people and their Danish
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leaders. Only a few former resistance leaders, some journalists and
politicians, urged action to meet the present threat. She thought that
fatalism and skepticism dominated Danish thinking. 22 In her mind
neither the Nazi occupation of World War II nor a potential future
Soviet occupation had reversed these attitudes. She observed that
the "Danes have taken no steps toward industrial mobilization to
back up [the] Allied defense effort." Economic and fiscal problems
appeared to have more urgency than defense issues. Hopes that
new Liberal-Conservative government that replaced the Social
Democrats would pursue defense issues with more vigor had not
materialized. Two positive factors she saw for the United States
were the enormous prestige in Denmark of General Dwight
Eisenhower, the new NATO commander, and the healthy effect the
Norwegian example exercised on the Danes, particularly Social
Democrats.23

The Silent Speech
In 1951 Anderson and Danish Foreign Minister Kraft each
recorded a speech for a nationwide radio broadcast in the United
States. They spoke about Danish defense efforts and the importance
of aid to Denmark. For some reason, air time for the two speeches
was never obtained and thus they were not heard by the American
public. Such a broadcast might'have been unprecedented. 24
Anderson's two-page single-spaced typed address had
encouraged the continuation of military aid, appealing to public
opinion rather than directly to the government officials. She
described America's interest in the "five hundred sparkling little
islands" and the Jutland peninsula that constituted Denmark. Any
real estate agent would have recognized the answer-location,
location, location. The Danish straits might serve as the passage for
enemy submarines into the Atlantic, and Denmark's colony,
Greenland, located along the polar air route, was essential to
America's air defense. The third, and supposedly most compelling,
reason for American interest in Denmark, though, was the Danish
people themselves. 25 "I have come to feel at home here -to respect
and cherish the Danish people," proclaimed Anderson, because they
were "so much like us Americans, in so many ways-kindred
spirits." The Danes had created a "sturdy democracy" with "an
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admirably high standard of living" and had done so "largely
through their own efforts." She mentioned the Grundtvigian ideal
of Denmark, a society with "few people who are too rich and still
fewer who are too poor." While the Danes were as skilled and
highly trained as any people in the world, nevertheless, she
admitted that Denmark "could not possibly develop-on its owneffective defense forces." 26
Anderson addressed concerns about the Danish spirit of
neutrality, providing several examples of values Denmark and the
United States shared. She mentioned freedom, a love for peace, and
opposition to dictatorship and aggression. Denmark, she said, "tried
in the past to maintain a policy of neutrality as we did." [author's
italics ] World War II thoroughly discredited that policy for both
countries, on December 7, 1941 for the United States, and April 9,
1940 for Denmark. She characterized Danish defense efforts as
"serious and wholehearted." Continued aid would enhance the
courage to defend Danish soil against an attack.
Anderson
contended such aid would not be wasted because the Danes "would
use well, whatever help we give them." 27
While that speech was not heard in the United States, a Saturday
Evening Post article a month later, in May, featured Eugenie
Anderson with the headline "Denmark's American Sweetheart." 28
The next line declared, "Pretty Eugenie Anderson, a small-town
housewife, went adventuring at the age of 40-and a whole country
fell hard for our first woman ambassador." 29 Senator Humphrey
informed Anderson of a September evening he spent at the Danish
embassy in Washington, D.C. "I can well understand why you love
Denmark after having spent this pleasant social hour with some of
the Danish people," he wrote. During the evening he found many
Danish admirers of the American ambassador. "In fact," reported
Humphrey, "every person at the dinner party spoke in glowing
terms about Eugenie Anderson... I basked in your glory." 30
Military Assessments
The United States needed Anderson's popularity to help smooth
over Danish resentment of being criticized. Brigadier General
George Olmsted, director of the of the Department of Defense's
Office of Military Assistance, testified before a sub-committee of the
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House of Representatives Appropriations Committee on September
28, 1951. His Congressional testimony concerning the Mutual
Security Program and Danish defense efforts was printed in a
government publication in October, and these published comments
provoked a strong reaction in Denmark. Danish Ambassador
Henrik Kauffman presented to the State Department an aide memoire
that specifically cited two portions. General Olmsted had told the
congressional committee, "that Denmark is making very slow
progress in achieving the limited defensive posture commensurate
with her potential." Furthermore, he insisted that "strong leadership
and continued pressure will be needed to overcome her present
apathetic attitude." Olmsted remained pessimistic, believing that,
the prospects of Denmark meeting her NATO commitments
are poor, as there is a general unwillingness on the part of the
people to sacrifice their high standard of living, a strong will
to resist is not evident and a sense of urgency is lacking. 31
The Danish aide memoire stated that those remarks created "a most
unfortunate impression" that would "unavoidably be interpreted as
an unjustified interference in Denmark's internal affairs. The Danish
Government therefore views what has occurred with serious regret."
The State Department released a press statement insisting that the
United States recognized that the Danish government decided the
extent of Danish defense efforts and that the United States had no
intention currently or previously to pressure the Danish
government. The United States simply sought constant consultation
regarding their common defense efforts. 32
Meanwhile, Anderson was taking her first trip back to the United
States since she had come to Denmark as ambassador when all this
uproar occurred. Whether or not Anderson's comments influenced
views in the United States, the Danes appreciated her support. The
Danish press reaction was widespread, as was its coverage of
Anderson's speaking positively on Denmark's behalf. A Politiken
editorial said Anderson's immediate objections to the criticism of
Denmark's military participation in NATO was "a good thing" and
that her authority came "through her first-hand knowledge of
Danish affairs."
General Olmsted's knowledge of Denmark,
however, was minimal. Politiken regarded American vigilance
against Communism as a fear that "sometimes borders on hysteria."
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Hence, the irony of the United States ignoring how fertile a country's
soil was for communism. The Danes knew best as to how much they
could carry. 33 Social Demokraten contended that Anderson was in a
better position to understand Danish conditions than those in the
Washington D.C. defense establishment and she had countered their
criticism. A Social Demokraten editorial asserted that fighting
communism required, "an internal defense consisting in the
preservation of the highest possible standard of living." 34
Anderson's remarks in many ways reiterated her recorded, but
not broadcasted speech. The Danish press covered her statements to
the press wire services and American television. While not all Danes
fully realized the urgency of the current situation she said that
neither had people in the United States. Once the Danes make a
decision, she asserted that "they will act and keep their promises."
She considered current Danish efforts "encouraging" despite the
long way ahead for all in NATO. Because of all she had witnessed
while in Denmark she said, "I am definitely not downhearted." 35 On
American television, Anderson stressed Denmark's willingness to
participate in the free world's defense, mentioning Denmark's
vulnerable proximity, "about fifty kilometers from the Danish
border and barely one hour's flight from the beautiful capital of
Copenhagen, lies the Soviet Union." Reports also cited Anderson's
appeals in Washington to immediately abolish restrictions on Danish
cheese imports. 36 While she mentioned shortcomings of Danes and
Denmark, she also pointed out shortcomings of Americans and the
Western alliance overall.
Anderson proved her diplomatic skill in public while revealing
her analytical skills in private. The most effective way to influence
Danish policy, she contended, was through consensus among the
NATO countries rather than the United States unilaterally dictating
programs. The Danes were well aware of their smallness, yet
considered their role important and desired respect. Anderson
recommended against U.S. sponsored public opinion surveys. The
Danes were not only "very literate" but also "hypersensitive" and
United States government sponsored surveys would be judged
"improper and offensive." A 1949 survey conducted in Denmark
created strong criticism since the United States was soon recognized
as its source.37 Anderson's goal was to build up the Danish will to
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resist the Soviets to the "level of [the] Finns in 1939 when they took
on Russia single-handed with [a] handful of obsolete war planes and
only four AA guns." 38 This required working within the NATO
framework, trusting that the Danes would make the best use of
American aid without the United States telling them how. American
pressure would only create Danish resentment while reducing their
zeal and self respect. 39
Apparently American officials thought the Danish record of
determined military resistance paled by comparison with its
neighbors.
The tenth anniversary celebration of Denmark's
liberation, thought some American observers, overstated the role of
the Danish resistance movement. Compared to what had actually
occurred during World War II, an embassy report contended that
the Danish celebrations were,
an orgy of self heroics largely fostered by a national
inferiority complex stemming from Denmark's poor
example compared to that of neighboring countries as
Norway and the Netherlands. 40
Indeed, in an assessment of the Military Assistance Program for
Denmark, the team assigned to Denmark had several critical
conclusions regarding the previous five years (1950-1955). Among
them, that Denmark "was capable of a greater defense effort" failing
to make a defense effort commensurate with its potential, just as
General Olmsted had earlier suggested. Furthermore, the Danish
military had failed to improve commensurate with the spending the
United States had made. The Danish government had not taken
effective action to increase the Danish military's capability.41
These harsh assessments were not made public and diminished
neither Anderson's popularity among Danish officials, nor her
overall view of her service in Denmark. Kraft credited Anderson
with helping to maintain and develop Danish confidence in the
United States. She was "a close and dear friend" who had stood like
a "lioness" for Denmark in the United States. When Anderson
advocated Denmark's case, Kraft insisted she was also best serving
the interests of the United States and the entire NATO community.
Kraft stressed the common interests between the United States and
Denmark. Her cooperation with the current and previous Danish
governments was, according to Kraft, "a model of how cooperation
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between allied states should be conducted." 42 King Frederik
conferred the Grand Cross of the ancient Order of the Dannebrog to
Anderson, the first woman ever to receive that distinction, and she
was the first woman outside the Royal House of Denmark to have
her coat of arms hung in the Frederiksborg Castle church. 43
She had not fundamentally altered either Danish or American
policy, but her practice of diplomacy was successful. The Danes
liked what they saw of Anderson. Her style was appealing, but the
style also had substance, from speaking the language, to sending her
kids to Danish schools, to establishing personal contacts with
prominent and ordinary Danes in every walk of life. While Danes
considered her a "lioness for Denmark" she continued to provide the
United States with a skeptical, if not critical view of Danish defense
efforts. Eugenie Anderson was indeed an effective ambassador for
the United States in Denmark during a challenging time. She was a
lioness, not just for Denmark in the United States, but for the United
States in Denmark.
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